

































Revisiting the Progressive Consumption




This paper revisits the personal expenditure tax (PET), the most promi-
nent version of a progressive consumption tax. The PET has a long intellectual
tradition in economics, and the merits and demerits of this alternative to the
personal income tax have been discussed at length. What has been missing in
the literature so far, however, is a systematic account of its effect on the busi-
ness cycle. This paper therefore seeks to add to the theoretical literature on
the PET and the wider literature on automatic fiscal stabilizers by analyzing
the PET’s macroeconomic properties in a modern business cycle model. To
this effect, the paper introduces a highly stylized PET into a standard New
Keynesian DSGE model, derives a log-linear version of the model, and draws
a comparison with the existing income tax. The model simulations show that
the two tax systems lead to quite different macroeconomic dynamics. Fur-
thermore, it is found that the PET yields welfare gains, relative to the income
tax, for all the demand shocks considered. The PET yields welfare losses,
however, under a supply shock.
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1 Introduction
“... the Equality of Imposition consisteth rather in the Equality of
that which is consumed, than of the riches of the persons that consume
the same. For what reason is there, that he which laboureth much, and
sparing the fruits of his labour, consumeth little, should be more charged,
than he that living idlely getteth little, and spendeth all he gets: seeing the
one hath no more protection from the Common-wealth than the other?
But when the Impositions are layd upon those things which men consume,
every man payeth Equally for what he useth: Nor is the Common-wealth
defrauded by the luxurious waste of private men.”
- Hobbes (1651, p.181)
“Such a tax policy would discourage mansions and encourage facto-
ries. When rich men are an offense in the eyes of the relatively poor, it
is because of their big domestic establishments and their big spendings,
not because of their big savings and big industrial plants. Snobbery goes
with the idle and extravagant way of living—with diamonds and retinues
of servants; but snobbery is seldom seen in a big factory where the owner
himself works. In fact, few workers in democratic America object to the
rich man who lives and works like a poor man—who puts his gains into
instruments of production, not into instruments of consumption.”
- Fisher and Fisher (1942, p.94)
“It is only by spending, not by earning or saving, that an individual
imposes a burden on the rest of the community in attaining his own
ends.”
- Kaldor (1955, p.53)
The personal expenditure tax (PET) has a long intellectual tradition in eco-
nomics. Famous proponents of this, largely untested1, alternative to the personal
income tax have been, amongst others, John Stuart Mill, Alfred Marshall, Arthur
Pigou, Irving Fisher, Nicholas Kaldor, and James Meade.2 The main idea behind the
1According to Goode (1980), the only countries that briefly experimented with a PET are India
and Sri Lanka (in the 1970s). More recent experiments are unknown to the author of this article.
2See e.g. Mill (1884, Book V, Chapter 1), Marshall (1925), Pigou (1928, Part II, Chapter
10), Fisher (1939, 1942), Fisher and Fisher (1942), Kaldor (1955), and Institute for Fiscal Studies
(1978). Before Irving Fisher showed that a PET could be implemented via a relatively simple set
of accounting rules, the practicality of such a tax was generally questioned, however. Accordingly,
Mill, Marshall, and Pigou were convinced of the theoretical merits of a PET but had doubts
about its practical implementation. John Maynard Keynes, in a similar vein, declared before the
Committee on National Debt and Taxation (Colwyn Committee) that whereas the tax is “perhaps
theoretically sound, it is practically impossible” (quoted in Kaldor, 1955, p.12).
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PET, put forward most prominently in Fisher and Fisher (1942) and Kaldor (1955),
is quite simple: individuals (or households) report, in a first step, their income to
the tax authority, and deduct, in a second step, all (net) savings. The resulting
tax base equals personal consumption expenditure, to which, as under most conven-
tional systems of personal income taxation, a set of graduated tax rates is finally
applied.3 The PET, or at least its common formulation with graduated tax rates,
is thus a progressive consumption tax.4 Other less familiar versions of a progressive
consumption tax (not covered here for the sake of brevity), e.g. David Bradford’s
more recent “X-Tax” (see e.g. Bradford, 1986; Viard and Carroll, 2012), may differ
in terms of the details of implementation, but have two key features with the PET
in common: firstly, savings (or investments) are, one way or another, exempted from
the tax base; and secondly, the tax is imposed (at least in part) on individuals, thus
implying that the tax structure can easily be made progressive.5 The first point
clearly differentiates a PET-type system from the existing income tax6, the second
from existing sales or value-added taxes.7
The case for the PET has been made on several grounds. Proponents argue
that the PET would allow to retain the basic progressivity of the personal income
tax (in contrast to a VAT or sales tax) but be superior to the latter—by virtue
of having a consumption tax base—on grounds of equity, economic efficiency, and
administrative simplicity.8
The equity argument in favor of taxing consumption is straightforward and can
be traced back to at least Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan. Individuals (or households),
it is claimed, should not be taxed according to what they contribute to a society’s
3The PET could be implemented in practice through, e.g., the use of so-called “qualified
accounts”. For the sake of brevity, we cannot deal with this important issue here. We refer the
reader to U.S. Treasury (1977), Institute for Fiscal Studies (1978), or Graetz (1979) for an extensive
discussion of the implementation issues regarding the PET.
4To be more exact, a consumption tax is according to definition progressive when the average
tax rate increases in the amount of consumption. A flat tax rate with only an allowance (e.g. the
“Flat Tax” proposed by Hall and Rabushka, 1985) also satisfies this condition. Most formulations
of a progressive consumption tax resort to a set of graduated tax rates (in addition to an allowance),
however (see e.g. Fisher and Fisher, 1942; Kaldor, 1955; U.S. Treasury, 1977; Institute for Fiscal
Studies, 1978).
5An incomplete list of other contemporary economists that have endorsed some version of a
progressive consumption tax includes Kenneth Arrow (2015), Samuel Bowles (Bowles and Park,
2005), The Economist (2010), Martin Feldstein (1978), Robert Frank (2010, 2011, 2008), Kenneth
Rogoff (2014, 2016), Laurence Seidman (1997), and John Whalley (Fullerton et al., 1983; Shoven
and Whalley, 2005).
6It should be noted that the (income) tax system of many countries has some overlap with the
PET. Pension plans (e.g. individual retirement accounts in the U.S.) often allow tax-deductible
contributions and earnings to accumulate tax-free. Taxation only occurs at withdrawal. Tax-
free contributions to pensions plans are usually limited in size, however, and early withdrawal is
impractical or penalized.
7The PET and a VAT or sales tax further differ with respect to the incidence of taxation. See
e.g. Kaldor (1955, Chapter 1) for an early reference on this point.
8It is not possible to give a comprehensive review of the literature on the PET, or consumption
versus income taxation more generally, in this article. The reader may refer to U.S. Treasury
(1977), Institute for Fiscal Studies (1978), or Pechman (1980) for a very thorough comparison
between the PET and the income tax.
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common pool of goods and services (through supplying labor or capital); instead,
they should be taxed according to what they take out of the common pool (through
their consumption).9 In other words, actual spending, and not spending power (i.e.
income, or wealth), should be the basis for taxation (Kaldor, 1955, Chapter 1).
On grounds of economic efficiency, Irving Fisher has made a number of early con-
tributions in favor of a consumption tax (Fisher, 1937, 1939, 1942). According to
Fisher, taxing the income saved as well as the income from saving under an income
tax amounts to “double taxation”, discriminating against saving and discouraging
capital accumulation (and therefore also reducing consumption in the long-run).10
Expressed somewhat differently, income taxes are not neutral with respect to spend-
ing and saving, or, what amounts to the same thing, current and future consumption
(Kaldor, 1955, Chapter 2).11 They change the slope of the intertemporal budget
constraint by depressing the rate of return to the saver below the rate of return
of the underlying investment, thus distorting the intertemporal consumption choice
(U.S. Treasury, 1977, Chapter 2; Institute for Fiscal Studies, 1978, Chapter 3). A
consumption tax, in contrast, does not give rise to this intertemporal distortion.12,13
Lastly, and even more briefly, income taxes have been criticized on administrative
grounds for necessitating complex rules concerning the measurement or imputation
of income. A transition to a pure consumption tax would, for instance, allow to
abolish tax regulations regarding capital gains, depreciation, and corporate profits.14
Since the early contributions of Irving Fisher and Nicholas Kaldor, most scholarly
work on the PET appeared in the 1970s and early 1980s (e.g. Andrews, 1974; U.S.
Treasury, 1977; Kay and King, 1978; Institute for Fiscal Studies, 1978; Graetz,
9In the context of the debate on the PET, this point has been raised by e.g. Kaldor (1955,
Chapter 1), Institute for Fiscal Studies (1978, Chapter 3), Seidman (1997, Chapter 3), and also
the political philosopher John Rawls (1971, Chapter 5). For opposing views, see e.g. Goode (1980)
or Pechman (1990).
10See e.g. also U.S. Treasury (1977, Chapter 2), Institute for Fiscal Studies (1978, Chapter 23),
Fullerton et al. (1983), Seidman (1997), or Okamoto (2005) for more recent contributions on the
relative superiority of a (progressive) consumption tax with respect to the incentives to accumulate
capital.
11Income taxes discriminate against “late consumption” and, by implication, “early work” (rel-
ative to “early consumption” and “late work”). See e.g. U.S. Treasury (1977, Chapter 2).
12This at least holds when the individual faces a time-invariant consumption tax rate. Note,
however, that a consumption tax, like an income tax, still distorts the individual’s labor-leisure
choice. Furthermore, the tax exemption of savings lowers the tax base under a consumption tax
and thus ceteris paribus requires higher effective tax rates, thereby exaggerating the intratemporal
distortion. It is therefore not clear from a theoretical point of view whether consumption taxes
are superior to income taxes on efficiency grounds (i.e. tax systems cannot be compared by simply
counting the number of economic distortions; see e.g. Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980).
13A remotely related argument in favor of a consumption tax is that in the presence of capital
market imperfections, exempting saved income from the tax base would allow entrepreneurs with-
out access to external finance to fully reinvest their profits and thus to expand their enterprise
more rapidly than under an income tax. See e.g. Institute for Fiscal Studies (1978, Chapter 2).
14See e.g. Andrews (1974) or U.S. Treasury (1977, Chapter 2). For a comprehensive case
against a PET-type system on administrative grounds, see e.g. Graetz (1979). Note that we
cannot cover the related topic of corporate taxes in this article. It shall only be mentioned that
most PET proponents either argue in favor of the abolishment of such taxes or suggest to implement
corporate taxes on a pure cash flow basis.
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1979; Pechman, 1980; Fullerton et al., 1983), with the most comprehensive accounts
being the U.S. Treasury’s Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform (1977) and the Institute
for Fiscal Studies’ The Structure and Reform of Direct Taxation (1978).15 More
recently, there has been renewed interest in the subject. Particularly in the context
of the inequality debate, peaking with the publication of Thomas Piketty’s Capital in
the Twenty-First Century (Piketty and Goldhammer, 2014), some economists have
argued (see e.g. The Economist, 2010; Frank, 2011b; Rogoff, 2014, 2016; Arrow,
2015) that a PET, or some other version of a progressive consumption tax, would
allow to address the growing problem of economic inequality more efficiently, i.e.
with less harmful effects on for instance savings or work incentives, and in a more
targeted way (since we should ultimately care most about consumption inequality)
than measures based on the taxation of income (e.g. a significant increase in top
income tax rates; see Piketty et al., 2011) or wealth (e.g. the introduction of a global
wealth tax; see Piketty and Goldhammer, 2014).16 With some countries rapidly
moving towards a cashless economy, and others at least entertaining the idea of
abolishing cash, this and other debates around the PET might grow in importance
since one of the major obstacles to the PET’s implementation—tax evasion through
cash hoarding in the transitional period (see e.g. Graetz, 1980; Seidman, 1997)—
would disappear in such an economy.
Against this backdrop and given the growing academic interest on the role of fis-
cal policy in the macroeconomy following the financial crisis of 2007-08, this paper
seeks to add to the existing literature on the merits and demerits of the PET by
shedding light on a so far rather neglected issue: the PET’s effect on the business
cycle. It is by now a well-established result in macroeconomics that the design of
the tax and transfer system affects the cyclical properties of the economy; the liter-
ature on automatic fiscal stabilizers has explored how government policies like e.g.
progressive income taxes or unemployment benefits—policies enacted to promote
redistributive or social goals rather than macroeconomic goals—help mitigate the
impact of shocks on the real economy. To name but two studies that rely on micro-
simulations, Auerbach and Feenberg (2000), for instance, find that the U.S. income
and payroll tax alone offsets roughly 8 percent of a shock to GDP. More recently,
Dolls et al. (2012) find that automatic stabilizers absorb 32% (38%) of a propor-
tional shock to household income and 34% (47%) of an unemployment shock in the
U.S. (EU).17 There still remains uncertainty about the quantitative significance of
15The reports of the U.S. Treasury and the UK-based Institute for Fiscal Studies were produced
under the guidance of David Bradford and James Meade, respectively. The UK report recommends
the adoption of a progressive consumption tax (given that transitional problems can be dealt with
satisfactorily), the U.S. report sees the tax as a promising alternative to the income tax.
16Two contributions, Bowles and Park (2005) and Frank (2008), also need to be mentioned
in this regard. Both make the case for a progressive consumption tax on grounds of positional
externalities in the consumption sphere.
17Mattesini and Rossi (2012) and McKay and Reis (2016a,b) are other recent contributions on
automatic stabilizers.
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the automatic stabilizers (see e.g. Veld et al., 2013) and the relative importance
of the various stabilization channels (see e.g. McKay and Reis, 2016b), but a key
take-away of the literature is that the design of the tax and transfer system matters
for macroeconomic fluctuations.18
To the best of our knowledge, Kaldor (1955, Chapter 6) is the only scholar that
explicitly discusses the role of the PET in a business cycle context. Kaldor argues
that discretionary tax changes are a more efficient instrument of macroeconomic
control under a PET than under an income tax because the PET allows the poli-
cymaker to operate directly on aggregate demand.19 Kaldor, yet, does not discuss
the built-in stabilization properties of the PET, i.e. its potential role as an auto-
matic stabilizer. Seidman (1997, Chapter 4) solely addresses the possible short-term
macroeconomic problems when transitioning to a PET. The two most exhaustive
accounts of the PET, U.S. Treasury (1977) and Institute for Fiscal Studies (1978),
do not touch on business cycle issues at all.20
In this paper, we contribute to the literature on the PET and the wider literature
on automatic fiscal stabilizers by analyzing the PET’s macroeconomic properties in a
modern business cycle model. More specifically, we propose a simple way to model
a PET and introduce the latter into an otherwise standard, closed-economy New
Keynesian DSGE model. Mattesini and Rossi (2012) have shown, using the same
baseline model, that a corresponding progressive tax on (wage) income considerably
changes the economy’s response to shocks (relative to a flat tax). We investigate,
instead, how the PET affects this response. The main aim of the paper is thus to help
understand how a move to a different tax system, one that relies on the progressive
taxation of consumption expenditure as opposed to income, affects macroeconomic
fluctuations, and consequently, economic welfare.
18McKay and Reis (2016b) also provide an excellent review of the literature.
19To quote Kaldor at length: “Thus from the point of view of the efficient conduct and control
of the economy it seems pointless to have taxes of any other kind than taxes (or subsidies) on
expenditure. Income taxes, or taxes on business savings, are blunt, cumbrous, and ineffective as
instruments of control—they operate in a round-about manner with uncertain effect except in
those cases (like the taxation of the working classes) where income and expenditure, for lack of a
cushion, are closely and rigidly linked so that the tax on the one has much the same influence as
the tax on the other. But in all other cases income taxes, whether personal or business taxes, are
peculiarly inappropriate as instruments of short-term or ‘anti-cyclical’ fiscal policy simply because
their short-run effect on conduct is both less significant and less predictable than their long-run
effect. If a change in the tax is introduced which appears to be associated with economic motives
(and it would be difficult for a Chancellor to hide his true motives in such eventualities) the
taxpayers (whether individuals or businesses) will expect it to be a temporary charge—which is
just what it is intended to be—and react to it in much the same way as if it were a capital tax;
[...] a purely short term change in income tax may be entirely at the expense of savings.” More
recently, Frank (2011, Chapter 5) reasserts this point. He argues that temporary income tax cuts
provide not much stimulus in a recession because they tend to be saved by consumers. In contrast,
a temporary tax cut under a PET would provide a strong stimulus because consumers can only
benefit from the cut by increasing their expenditures immediately.
20Institute for Fiscal Studies (1978, Chapter 1) explicitly states: “We have not examined the
special problems of the taxation of oil revenues or of land and development values. We have not
investigated the tax problems involved in short term demand management for the macroeconomic
control of economic activity. We have no intention of denying the great importance of these topics.”
5
The key results of the paper are the following: Firstly, we find that the PET, just
as the conventional progressive income tax, stabilizes output (relative to a flat tax)
and thus acts as an automatic stabilizer for the economy. Yet, and secondly, the
PET has a quantitatively different effect on the volatilities of most macroeconomic
variables than the progressive income tax. Thirdly, we find that a transition from
the existing progressive income tax to the PET would improve economic welfare
under government spending, monetary policy, time preference, and taste shocks.
Welfare would decline, however, under a technology shock.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, the DSGE model is presented
and a PET is introduced (along with a conventional progressive income tax). For
ease of illustration, a linearized model version is derived. The model is calibrated in
Section 3 and the model dynamics are analyzed using impulse response functions.
Section 4 conducts a comparative welfare analysis. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
The employed model is a textbook New Keynesian DSGE model of a closed economy
(Gal´ı, 2008), augmented by government expenditure and a progressive tax system.21
The model features several types of shocks commonly considered in the DSGE liter-
ature. We compare the economy’s response to these shocks under a progressive tax
on consumption (of the PET-type) with that under a conventional progressive tax
on (wage) income (Mattesini and Rossi, 2012). The economy is populated by a rep-
resentative household that maximizes lifetime utility with respect to consumption
and hours worked subject to a lifetime budget constraint. There are two types of
firms. A perfectly competitive retail firm utilizes the output of intermediate goods
firms to assemble a final good, the latter being used for private and government
consumption. Intermediate goods firms are many in number, produce a differenti-
ated good using labor only, and set prices in a staggered manner as in Calvo (1983).
Monetary policy follows a standard Taylor-type interest rate rule (Taylor, 1993),
government expenditure an exogenous process.22
21At the very outset, note that this model does not allow for savings in equilibrium. We will
see that it still makes a difference in terms of economic stabilization whether the expenditure side
or the revenue side of the household budget is “targeted” by the progressive tax system.
22In what follows, letters without a time index t always represent the (non-stochastic) steady
state value of the respective variable.
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2.1 The Household Sector
Expenditure Tax. We first consider the household problem under the PET.















subject to a sequence of flow budget constraints
(1 + τ ct )PtCt +Bt = Rt−1Bt−1 +WtNt + Πt − Tt (2)
where Et is the rational expectation operator, Ct a consumption bundle (defined
below), Pt the price index for final goods (also defined below), Nt hours worked,
and Wt the (nominal) wage. Prices and wages are taken as given by the household.
Bt is the amount of a risk-free one-period bond purchased at the beginning of pe-
riod t, Rt is the corresponding (gross nominal) interest rate. Πt are the profits of
the intermediate goods sector, transferred to the owner household in the form of
dividends. The coefficients σ and ϕ determine the degree of relative risk aversion
and labor disutility (inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity), respectively. β
is the subjective discount factor, ψt a time preference shock, ξt a taste shock. Fi-
nally, the household faces the tax τ ct on personal consumption expenditure as well
as lump-sum taxes Tt (which are zero on average; see below).
Our modeling strategy for the personal expenditure tax τ ct follows Guo and
Lansing (1998) and Mattesini and Rossi (2012).23 We assume that the tax schedule
τ ct has the form






where C is steady state consumption and the reference value for taxation, and where
ηc > 1 pins down the level of the consumption tax schedule (the average tax rate),
while φc ≥ 0 determines the progressivity of the consumption tax schedule.24
23Guo and Lansing (1998) and Mattesini and Rossi (2012) also use a representative agent model.
The former consider a progressive tax on capital and labor income in a Real Business Cycle model,
the latter a progressive tax on labor income in a standard New Keynesian model.
24Notice that an income tax usually applies the relevant tax rate to a tax base that includes the
tax payment itself, whereas consumption taxes usually apply the tax rate to a base that excludes the
tax payment. Income tax rates are thus stated in what is called a tax-inclusive form, consumption
taxes in a tax-exclusive form. To not confuse the reader, we follow the convention and also quote
the personal expenditure tax in tax-exclusive form. The drawback is that the average tax rate and
the progression coefficient have to be chosen and interpreted with care in order to make a valid
comparison with the progressive income tax (e.g. holding the tax burden constant, tax-exclusive
rates τex appear higher than tax-inclusive rates: τ in < τex = τ
in
1−τ in ). The results of this paper,
however, are not affected by the modeling strategy. To be more concrete, we also checked a tax-





with ηc ∈ (0, 1], φc ≥ 0, and where Cin corresponds to
before-tax or tax-inclusive consumption. This is the schedule employed below for the progressive
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To understand the tax schedule, first assume that φc = 0 holds. In this case, the
tax rate on personal consumption expenditure τ c = ηc− 1 is constant and we speak
of a “flat” consumption tax.25 In contrast, when φc > 0 holds, the average tax rate
τ ct varies with current period consumption Ct. More precisely, the average tax rate
τ ct will be above (below) the steady state tax rate τ
c whenever the tax base Ct is
above (below) the reference value C, with larger deviations leading to larger rate
adjustments. In this case, it is appropriate to speak of a “progressive” consumption
tax (this is the typical version of the PET).
To see this last point more formally, notice that the following relationship be-
tween the marginal tax rate τ c,mt =
∂(τct Ct)
∂Ct
and the average tax rate τ ct holds:








Accordingly, whenever φc > 0, the marginal tax rate is higher than the average tax
rate, or, what amounts to the same thing, the average tax rate increases in the tax
base.


















−φc(1 + φc) (6)
where the first condition is a consumption Euler equation and where the second
condition determines the household’s labor supply. Apparently, the progressive con-
sumption tax has a similar effect on the household’s intertemporal consumption
choice as an increase in the concavity of the household’s consumption utility func-
tion (an increase in the coefficient σ). That is, all other things equal, the household
income tax and the one also used by Guo and Lansing (1998) and Mattesini and Rossi (2012). In









Pt + Bt = Rt−1Bt−1 + WtNt + Πt − Tt where the first term
in brackets on the left-hand side is equal to Cint and where C
ex
t is after-tax or tax-exclusive
consumption (the consumption entering the utility function). This modeling strategy seems not
very intuitive and requires to keep track of both Cex and Cin. Most importantly, the exact same
results can be replicated with the tax-exclusive schedule (3) when adjusting the coefficients ηc and
φc properly. See also Section 3.1 for more details on this issue.
25As a side note, this case is identical to the conventional approach to model value-added taxes
in the DSGE literature. That is, the literature assumes, unrealistically, that the VAT liability
is transferred to the government by the consumer (i.e. a flat PET is actually assumed). In a
business cycle context, this assumption seems innocuous as long as the (alleged) VAT rate remains
unchanged. Voigts (2017) convincingly argues, however, that this modeling approach leads to
erroneous conclusions about the macroeconomic effects of discretionary changes in the tax rate
because instantaneous pass-through to consumers is implicitly assumed, contradicting a wealth of
empirical evidence and being inconsistent with the sticky-price assumption in DSGE models.
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seeks a smoother consumption path over time. The tax’s effect on labor supply is
less apparent but also resembles that of an increase in σ. This will become more
obvious when we look at a linearized version of equation (6) later.
In summary, with the PET we have introduced a countercyclical device (at least
insofar as consumption and output move together) on the expenditure side of the
household’s budget. Unsurprisingly, we will see below that this device reduces out-
put fluctuations in general equilibrium, i.e., it acts as an automatic fiscal stabilizer
for the economy.
Income Tax. We next consider the household problem under the income tax.




Rt−1 − τ int(Rt−1 − 1)
)
Bt−1 +WtNt(1− τnt ) + Πt(1− τ div)− Tt (7)
where τ int and τ div are “flat” tax rates on interest income and dividend income,
respectively, and where τnt is a wage tax schedule given by (see Mattesini and Rossi,
2012)






with Yn,t ≡ WtNtPt denoting current period real wage income, and with the corre-
sponding steady state value Yn ≡ WNP serving as the reference value for taxation.26
The coefficient ηn ∈ (0, 1] determines the level of the tax schedule (the average tax
rate), the coefficient φn ∈ [0, 1) its progressivity.27
It is again straightforward to show that the following relationship between the
marginal tax rate (on wage income) τn,mt =
∂(τnt Yn,t)
∂Yn,t










We thus speak of a “progressive” (“flat”) wage tax schedule when φn > 0 (φn = 0)
holds.
Under this tax regime, the household’s consumption Euler equation and the
26Note that in contrast to most of the DSGE literature, and to obtain a maximum distinction
between a tax on consumption expenditure only and an income tax, we allow for a “comprehensive”
version of the latter and thus also consider a tax on household interest income. The tax can of
course (and will) be “switched off” later to draw a proper comparison between the PET introduced
above and the relevant existing literature on the progressive income tax (Mattesini and Rossi, 2012).
27The mechanics underlying this tax schedule correspond to those of the consumption tax
schedule introduced above. The wage tax is quoted in tax-inclusive form, however.
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= Nϕ+φnt . (11)
The consumption Euler equation is standard, except for the fact that the tax on
interest income τ int depresses the household’s rate of return on saving. Regarding
labor supply, note that as the progressivity of the wage tax schedule increases,
the quantity of hours worked becomes less responsive to a change in the real wage
(holding consumption constant), or, to put it another way, the labor supply curve
becomes steeper. That is, to induce a given increase in hours worked, a larger
increase in the real wage is necessary (when the tax system is progressive) since a
growing fraction of the latter is taxed away.
We will see below that through this supply-side effect, the progressive (wage)
income tax reduces output fluctuations and thus acts as an automatic fiscal stabilizer
(we refer to Mattesini and Rossi (2012) for a detailed account on this point).28
2.2 The Government
2.2.1 Fiscal Policy
Depending on the tax regime in place, the fiscal authority finances an exogenous
stream of government consumption Gt through either a tax on household consump-
tion expenditure or household income.29 Across regimes, the government imposes a
lump-sum tax Tt (which is zero on average) to balance the budget in each period.
30
Expenditure Tax. Under the PET, the period budget constraint of the gov-
ernment is given by
PtGt = τ
c
t PtCt + Tt. (12)
Income Tax. Under the income tax, in contrast, the period budget constraint
of the government is given by
PtGt = τ
n
t WtNt + τ
divΠt + τ
int(Rt−1 − 1)Bt−1 + Tt. (13)
28Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) also stress this supply-side stabilization effect of the progressive
income tax system: In the presence of labor demand fluctuations, a steeper labor supply curve
reduces fluctuations in employment and ceteris paribus also output.
29As will be clear below, Gt is defined analogously to the private consumption bundle Ct.
30Allowing for government debt would not change our results since Ricardian equivalence holds
in the model economy.
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2.2.2 Monetary Policy
Monetary policy follows a standard Taylor-type interest rate rule (Taylor, 1993).







where R is the steady state interest rate, φpi > 1 the Taylor inflation coefficient, and
where vt is a monetary policy shock.
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2.3 The Firm Sector
2.3.1 Final Goods Producer
The representative, perfectly competitive final goods producer assembles the final










where Xt(i) is the amount of intermediate good i, with i ∈ [0, 1], and where p is the
elasticity of substitution (between intermediate goods). The firm takes the prices of
the intermediate goods Pt(i) as well as the price of the final good Pt as given. Profit
















2.3.2 Intermediate Goods Producers
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive intermediate goods firms, in-
dexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Firm i produces differentiated good Yt(i) according to
Yt(i) = AtNt(i) (18)
where Nt(i) is the amount of labor employed by firm i and At the (stochastic) level of
technology common to all firms. The production function implies that real marginal
31In the common case of τ int = 0, the steady state interest rate is given by R = β−1. Otherwise,
we have R = 1−βτ
int
β(1−τ int) . Note that these results follow from the Euler equations.
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costs MCt are equalized across firms, i.e.




We assume that intermediate goods firms set prices in a staggered fashion as in
Calvo (1983). Each period t, a randomly drawn fraction of firms 1 − θp, for some
0 < θp < 1, is able to reset their prices, whereas the remaining fraction of firms θp is
not able to do so. Resetting firms take the demand functions for their good (16) as



















where Qt,t+k is the household’s stochastic discount factor.
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2.4 Exogenous Processes
We have five exogenous variables in our model: a productivity shock At, government
spending Gt, a monetary policy shock vt, a time preference shock ψt, and a taste





. As is standard in the literature,
we assume stationary AR(1) processes for all shocks, i.e.
at = ρaat−1 + a,t (21)
ĝt = ρgĝt−1 + g,t (22)
vt = ρvvt−1 + v,t (23)
ψt = ρψψt−1 + ψ,t (24)
ξt = ρξξt−1 + ξ,t (25)
with 0 < ρ < 1 and innovation  drawn from a standard normal distribution.
2.5 Market Clearing and Aggregation
In a representative agent model such as the one at hand, bond market clearing
implies Bt = 0 for all periods t.
The labor market is in equilibrium when household labor supply equals aggregate
32Because firms are owned by households they also use the same discount factor as



























The intermediate goods market is in equilibrium when supply equals demand for
all intermediate goods i ∈ [0, 1], i.e.
Yt(i) = Xt(i). (27)
In turn, the final goods market is in equilibrium when aggregate supply or real
GDP equals the sum of private and government consumption demand, i.e.
Yt = Ct +Gt. (28)
Following Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2006), the aggregate production function




where st ≥ 1 is determined by the difference equation
st = (1− θp)(p˜t)−p + θp(1 + pit)pst−1 (30)




and where pit denotes (final goods) price inflation. The variable
st represents the resource cost from inefficient price dispersion across intermediate
goods firms when the value exceeds one.33
Finally, in the Calvo pricing model, the evolution of aggregate or final goods
prices is given by the law of motion
1 = θp(1 + pit)
−1+p + (1− θp)p˜t1−p . (31)
2.6 Steady State
In the next section, we will employ a (log-)linear approximation of the model around
the (non-stochastic) steady state. It will thus be useful to briefly characterize this
steady state.
We first assume that aggregate price inflation is zero in the steady state. To find
aggregate output or activity next, we combine the household’s labor supply first




(from (19) and (20)) and
Y = N and make use of the household’s budget constraint.
33Since there is no price dispersion under flexible prices, st = 1 holds for all t in this case.
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Expenditure Tax. Accordingly, under the consumption tax, steady state out-
























We see that the steady state output depends on both the average level of taxation
(η) and the degree of tax progressivity (φ). Our model calibration below will ensure
that the steady state level of output is the same for both tax systems (i.e. the
incentives to supply labor are equalized in the steady state).
2.7 Linearization
To make the model more tractable, we now employ a (log-)linear approximation
of the model equations around the (non-stochastic) steady state. This also allows
us to condense the model into three familiar equations: a Phillips curve, an IS
curve, and a monetary policy rule. In the following, a small variable with a hat
denotes the log-deviation of the respective variable from its steady state value, i.e.






, where the last approximation holds for
“small” percentage deviations of Zt from Z. The subsequent account will be rather
brief but we will summarize our main findings at the end of this section.
2.7.1 The Phillips Curve
Expenditure Tax. After linearizing the price setting first order condition (20)
and the law of motion of the aggregate price index (31), we combine the resulting
equations to obtain the following standard forward-looking inflation equation
pit = βEt {pit+1}+ λm̂ct (34)
where λ ≡ (1−θp)(1−βθp)
θp
.35
We next derive linear expressions for the labor supply first-order condition (6),
marginal cost (19), the aggregate production function (29), and the definition of real
34To get this expression, we assumed a uniform tax rate for household labor and dividend
income.
35See e.g. Gal´ı (2008, Chapter 3). Further note that the time preference shock ψt and the taste
shock ξt have no first-order effect on the relationship between inflation and marginal cost.
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GDP (28), respectively:
ω̂t + ξt = (σ + φc)ĉt + ϕn̂t (35)
m̂ct = ω̂t − at (36)
ŷt = at + n̂t (37)
ŷt = γcĉt + (1− γc)ĝt (38)
with γc ≡ CY and where ω̂t ≡ ŵt − p̂t. As indicated above, it becomes obvious from
equation (35) that the PET has a similar effect on the labor supply decision as an
increase in the coefficient σ. We will refer to the resulting general equilibrium effects
below.
Combining the previous equations allows us to express marginal cost in terms of
aggregate output and the exogenous processes at, ĝt, and ξt:
m̂ct =
σ + ϕγc + φc
γc
ŷt − (1 + ϕ)at − (σ + φc)(1− γc)
γc
ĝt − ξt. (39)
Since m̂ct = 0 holds under flexible prices (i.e. the price markup is constant), we also
have
0 =
σ + ϕγc + φc
γc
ŷft − (1 + ϕ)at −
(σ + φc)(1− γc)
γc
ĝt − ξt (40)
where ŷft denotes the flexible price or “natural” output. Subtracting (40) from (39)
then yields
m̂ct =
σ + ϕγc + φc
γc
(ŷt − ŷft ) (41)
where the flexible price output is given by
ŷft =
(1 + ϕ)γc
σ + ϕγc + φc
at +
(σ + φc)(1− γc)
σ + ϕγc + φc
ĝt +
γc
σ + ϕγc + φc
ξt. (42)
Finally, by substituting (41) into (34), we obtain the New Keynesian Phillips
curve under the PET
pit = βEt {pit+1}+ κcy˜t (43)
where the slope of the Phillips curve is given by
κc ≡ λσ + ϕγc + φc
γc
(44)
and where y˜t ≡ ŷt − ŷft is the output gap.
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Income Tax. The linearized version of the labor supply first-order condition
(11) is given by
(1− φn)ω̂t + ξt = σĉt + (ϕ+ φn)n̂t. (45)
Using (45) instead of (35) and repeating the steps taken above, we obtain the
following New Keynesian Phillips curve under the progressive income tax (see Mat-
tesini and Rossi, 2012)
pit = βEt {pit+1}+ κny˜t (46)
where the slope of the Phillips curve is given by
κn ≡ λσ + γc(ϕ+ φn)
γc(1− φn) . (47)
The variable y˜t ≡ ŷt − ŷft represents the output gap under the income tax, and the
corresponding natural output is given by
ŷft =
(1 + ϕ)γc
σ + (ϕ+ φn)γc
at +
σ(1− γc)
σ + (ϕ+ φn)γc
ĝt +
γc
σ + (ϕ+ φn)γc
ξt. (48)
2.7.2 The IS Curve
Expenditure Tax. Linearizing the consumption Euler equation (5) gives
ĉt = Et {ĉt+1} − 1
σ + φc
(r̂t − Et {pit+1}+ Et {∆ψt+1 + ∆ξt+1}) . (49)
Combining the last equation with the linear expression for real GDP (38) yields
the model’s IS curve, expressed in terms of aggregate output, under the PET:
ŷt = Et {ŷt+1} − (1− γc)Et {∆ĝt+1} − γc
σ + φc
(
r̂t − Et {pit+1}




Expressed in terms of the output gap, the IS curve reads
y˜t = Et {y˜t+1} − γc
σ + φc
(
r̂t − Et {pit+1} − r̂rft
)
(51)




is the real interest rate under flexible prices, often
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denoted as the “natural” real rate, and given by36
r̂rft =
(1 + ϕ)(σ + φc)
σ + ϕγc + φc
Et {∆at+1} − (σ + φc)(1− γc)ϕ
σ + ϕγc + φc
Et {∆ĝt+1}
− ϕγc
σ + ϕγc + φc
Et {∆ξt+1} − Et {∆ψt+1} . (52)
Income Tax. Linearizing the consumption Euler equation (10) yields
ĉt = Et {ĉt+1} − 1
σ
(
(1− βτ int)r̂t − Et {pit+1}+ Et {∆ψt+1 + ∆ξt+1}
)
. (53)
The IS curve, expressed in terms of aggregate output, is then given by
ŷt = Et {ŷt+1} − (1− γc)Et {∆ĝt+1} − γc
σ
(
(1− βτ int)r̂t − Et {pit+1}




Expressed in terms of the output gap, the IS curve reads
y˜t = Et {y˜t+1} − γc
σ
(
(1− βτ int)r̂t − Et {pit+1} − r̂rft
)
(55)




is the (after-tax) real interest rate under
flexible prices and given by
r̂rft =
(1 + ϕ)σ
σ + (ϕ+ φn)γc
Et {∆at+1} − σ(1− γc)(ϕ+ φn)
σ + (ϕ+ φn)γc
Et {∆ĝt+1}
− (ϕ+ φn)γc
σ + (ϕ+ φn)γc
Et {∆ξt+1} − Et {∆ψt+1} . (56)
2.7.3 Government Policy
Finally, to close the model, the linearized version of the interest rate rule (14) is
given by
r̂t = φpipit + vt. (57)
Expenditure Tax. For the sake of completeness, the linearized version of the







36To obtain the natural real interest rate, insert the equation for natural output (42) into the
IS curve (50) and solve for the real interest rate.
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φn(ω̂t + n̂t). (59)
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Table 1: Summary: Linearized Model
Euler equation [ET] ĉt = Et {ĉt+1} − 1σ+φc (r̂t − Et {pit+1}+ Et {∆ψt+1 + ∆ξt+1})
Euler equation [IT] ĉt = Et {ĉt+1} − 1σ
(
(1− βτ int)r̂t − Et {pit+1}+ Et {∆ψt+1 + ∆ξt+1}
)
IS curve [ET] ŷt = Et {ŷt+1} − (1− γc)Et {∆ĝt+1} − γcσ+φc (r̂t − Et {pit+1}+ Et {∆ψt+1 + ∆ξt+1})
IS curve [IT] ŷt = Et {ŷt+1} − (1− γc)Et {∆ĝt+1} − γcσ
(
(1− βτ int)r̂t − Et {pit+1}+ Et {∆ψt+1 + ∆ξt+1}
)
Phillips curve [ET] pit = βEt {pit+1}+ λσ+γcϕ+φcγc (ŷt − ŷ
f
t )
Phillips curve [IT] pit = βEt {pit+1}+ λσ+γc(ϕ+φn)γc(1−φn) (ŷt − ŷ
f
t )




















Natural rate [ET] r̂rft =
(1+ϕ)(σ+φc)
σ+ϕγc+φc
Et {∆at+1} − (σ+φc)(1−γc)ϕσ+ϕγc+φc Et {∆ĝt+1} −
ϕγc
σ+ϕγc+φc
Et {∆ξt+1} − Et {∆ψt+1}
Natural rate [IT] r̂rft =
(1+ϕ)σ
σ+(ϕ+φn)γc
Et {∆at+1} − σ(1−γc)(ϕ+φn)σ+(ϕ+φn)γc Et {∆ĝt+1} −
(ϕ+φn)γc
σ+(ϕ+φn)γc
Et {∆ξt+1} − Et {∆ψt+1}
Labor supply [ET] (σ + φc)ĉt + ϕn̂t = ω̂t + ξt
Labor supply [IT] σĉt + (ϕ+ φn)n̂t = (1− φn)ω̂t + ξt












Production function ŷt = at + n̂t
Aggregate demand ŷt = γcĉt + (1− γc)ĝt
Output gap y˜t = ŷt − ŷft
Real marginal cost m̂ct = ω̂t − at
Monetary policy r̂t = φpipit + vt
Notes: ET (IT) denotes the model with progressive consumption (income) taxation. Equations without specification apply to both model versions. Note that some of
the equations are redundant but are shown nonetheless for comparative purposes.
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2.7.4 Model Summary
In conclusion, Table 1 contrasts both tax regimes. The linearized equations depicted
summarize the equilibrium dynamics of all the model variables. The model dynam-
ics, however, can also be expressed more compactly in terms of the New Keynesian
Phillips curve, the IS curve, and the interest rate rule only.
Expenditure Tax. Under the PET, the model’s linearized equilibrium can be
expressed compactly by the New Keynesian Phillips curve (43), the IS curve (51),
and the interest rate rule (57). These three equations, together with the process
for the natural rate of interest (52), fully describe the dynamics of inflation pit, the
output gap y˜t, and the interest rate r̂t.
Income Tax. Equivalently, under the income tax, the New Keynesian Phillips
curve (46), the IS curve (55), and the interest rate rule (57), together with the nat-
ural rate (56), completely determine the dynamics of inflation pit, the output gap y˜t,
and the interest rate r̂t.
Before we simulate the model to illustrate the general equilibrium effects of the
two tax systems, we need to discuss some of our previous findings.
Firstly, both model versions collapse into the same standard New Keynesian
model when we set φc = φn = 0 (and set τ
int = 0 under the income tax, as is
common in the literature), i.e. when we assume a flat tax system. Income and
consumption taxes are thus equivalent in this case.
Secondly, and as already suggested above, the equations for natural output show
that both tax systems act as an automatic stabilizer for the flexible-price economy
in the sense that the relevant shocks (technology at, government spending gt, taste
ξt) have a smaller impact on output (relative to the flat tax). The exception is the
PET’s amplifying effect on output under government spending shocks (the derivative
of the appropriate coefficient with respect to φc is positive). These effects will hold
in the sticky-price economy as well (see the next section).
Thirdly, unlike the progressive tax on wage income, the progressive tax on con-
sumption affects the household’s Euler equation and thus the economy’s IS curve.
Unsurprisingly, all other things equal, the progressive consumption tax creates a
greater incentive to smooth consumption (and thus output) over time, i.e., it makes
the economy less responsive to “intertemporal disturbances” (shocks to ψt and ξt)
and interest rate fluctuations (see e.g. equation (50)).
Fourthly, due to their effect on the labor supply decision, both the progressive
consumption tax and the progressive wage tax increase the slope of the Phillips
curve (relative to the flat tax). The intuition for the wage tax is straightforward (see
Mattesini and Rossi, 2012): a given increase in hours worked can only be induced by
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offering higher real wages than in the flat tax case since a growing fraction of wages
is taxed away. Consequently, increasing output above its natural level (through
hiring more labor, at least compared to the flexible price scenario) is more costly
for firms and creates more inflationary pressure. The intuition for the consumption
tax is not too dissimilar: households work to (eventually) consume. To induce a
given increase in hours, higher real wages than in the flat tax case have to be offered
because the accompanying consumption increase is taxed at increasing rates. We
thus observe more inflationary pressure when raising output above its natural level.37
However, notice that the Phillips curve is steeper under the progressive wage tax
for all (plausible) parameter values:38
κn > κc ⇔ σ + γc(1 + ϕ) > 1. (60)
3 Equilibrium Dynamics
In this section, we examine whether the structural differences between the PET
and the income tax identified above also lead to quantitatively significant differ-
ences in general equilibrium. To this effect, we compute impulse response functions;
these will graphically illustrate how the tax system affects our (linearized) model
economy’s cyclical behavior.39 We depict the dynamic responses for the progressive
consumption tax, the progressive income tax, and, for comparative purposes, a flat
tax. The program Dynare (Adjemian et al., 2011) is used for this exercise.40 As
a complement, we also present business cycle statistics of the simulated model (for
the progressive tax systems only).
3.1 Calibration
The calibration we employ for our model simulations is based on the assumption
that the relevant time period is one quarter. Our parametrization looks as follows:
37As already referred to above, note that an increase in the concavity of the household’s con-
sumption utility function (a larger σ) would have the same effect as the progressive consumption
tax in this regard. In this case, when increasing output above its natural level, higher real wages
have to be offered (relative to the case of a smaller σ) due to a more rapidly diminishing marginal
utility of consumption.
38To obtain this condition, simply rearrange the expressions for κn and κc and assume that
φc =
φn
1−φn . The latter assumption equalizes steady state employment and output (for the same
relative size of the government) and implies a comparable degree of tax progressivity across the
two tax systems. See the subsequent section 3.1 on the model’s calibration for details regarding
this point.
39We also employed a second-order approximation to the original, non-linear model equations.
The order of approximation does not affect the qualitative nature of the impulse responses.
40The linearized model is simple enough to be also solved by “pen and paper”. We used e.g. the
method of undetermined coefficients to derive closed-form solutions for inflation and the output
gap for the PET and an income tax with τ int = 0 (Mattesini and Rossi, 2012). See Appendix
A.1 for the results. This approach, however, becomes quite cumbersome if one is interested in the
responses of the remaining model variables as well.
21
the household’s subjective discount factor β is set to 0.99, consistent with a steady
state value of the real interest rate of approximately 4 percent. The values σ = 1
(log utility of consumption) and ϕ = 1 (unitary Frisch elasticity of labor supply)
for the household’s utility function are standard in the literature. The elasticity of
substitution between goods p takes a value of 6, implying a steady state gross price
markup of size 1.2 (for intermediate goods producers). The degree of price rigidity
is given by θp = 2/3, i.e. the average duration of (intermediate goods) prices is
assumed to be 3 quarters. These last two parametrizations are also commonly used
in the business cycle literature (see e.g. Gal´ı, 2008).
Turning to the fiscal and monetary policy parameters, we first have φpi = 1.5,
a standard value for the Taylor inflation coefficient. For the (progressive) income
tax, we set τ div = 0.2 and τn = 0.2 (i.e. ηn = 0.8), consistent with a government
spending share in GDP of 20% (1 − γc = 0.2). The wage income tax progressivity
parameter is set equal to the observed, GDP-weighted average value for the EA-12
member countries: φn = 0.34 (based on the computations of Mattesini and Rossi,
2012).41 As a baseline, we set τ int = 0, thereby replicating the income tax system
in Mattesini and Rossi (2012). To also implement a “comprehensive” income tax,
we set τ int = 0.2. For the (progressive) consumption tax, we assume that ηc = 1.25
holds, amounting to an average tax rate on consumption of 25% (τ c = 0.25).42
This again yields a government spending share in GDP of 20%. The value of the
consumption tax progressivity parameter is set to φc =
φn
1−φn = 0.51, a value that
aligns the steady state work incentives (and therefore the employment and output
levels) under the PET with those under the income tax (with φn = 0.34). This last
parametrization thus ensures that the two tax systems are equally “progressive”.43
As mentioned, we also consider a flat tax for comparative purposes below. Our
41The qualitative nature of our results does not depend on the size of this parameter. We choose
the EA-12 value because it is somewhat higher than e.g. the respective U.S. value (0.18) and thus
more convenient for illustrative purposes.
42Recall that we express the income tax in tax-inclusive form, the consumption tax in tax-
exclusive form, however. The tax rate on income thus only appears to be lower.
43The formulas for steady state output (32) and (33) show that given our choice of ηn and
ηc (our numbers imply the same relative size of the government), steady state output, and by





holds, implying identical incentives to supply labor in the steady state. This last point can also
be illustrated by evaluating the marginal tax rates, given by (4) and (9), at the steady state. For
our parametrization, this yields τ c,m ≈ 0.89 and τn,m ≈ 0.47, respectively. Hence, under the PET,
and starting in the steady state, 1.89 additional units of real income are required (obtainable by
supplying more labor) to increase consumption by one unit. Likewise, under the income tax, one
additional unit of real income allows to increase consumption by 0.53 units. In other words, 1.89
additional units of real income are required to increase consumption by one unit. We thus have
the same “rate of conversion” between labor and consumption across tax regimes. Finally, and as
mentioned earlier, notice that we could have expressed the consumption tax in tax-inclusive form
instead. In this case, the tax progressivity coefficients φ would have been directly comparable across
tax regimes (i.e. we would have chosen φc = 0.34 to guarantee the same degree of progressivity).
As explained above, our modeling strategy does not affect the results, i.e. the more intuitive tax-
exclusive formulation with φc =
φn
1−φn = 0.51 is equivalent to the tax-inclusive formulation with
φc = 0.34.
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model allows for two different versions of a flat tax: a flat income tax (φn = 0)
with interest rate taxation (τ int = 0.2); and a flat tax without interest rate tax-
ation (τ int = 0). In the latter case, the income tax (φn = 0) corresponds to the
consumption tax (φc = 0). See Section 2.7.
Finally, note that since we consider each shock type separately in the following
and are only interested in the qualitative nature of the subsequent results (given
the simplicity of our model economy), we will not make an effort to calibrate the
shock processes so as to match observable business cycle statistics. A calibration
exercise of this sort would also be quite cumbersome as we allow for five different
shock types. The autocorrelation coefficients ρ of the shock processes are thus all
set to the standard textbook value 0.9. The standard deviations of the innovations
 are all set to the standard value 0.01.44
Before we turn to the model simulations, notice that our parametrization implies
κc ≈ 0.49 and κn ≈ 0.67 (the corresponding value for the flat tax is roughly 0.38).
The progressive consumption tax thus indeed features a “flatter” Phillips curve than
the progressive income tax.
3.2 Model Simulations
Figures 1 to 5 in Appendix A.2 show the impulse response functions (for the main
model variables) to a technology, government spending, monetary policy, time pref-
erence, and taste shock, respectively.45 The figures show the responses of five dif-
ferent tax systems: the progressive consumption tax (PET), a progressive income
tax (IT) as in Mattesini and Rossi (2012) where τ int = 0 holds, a “comprehensive”
or “full” progressive income tax (full IT) where τ int > 0 holds in addition to the
previous system, a flat tax (FL) on either consumption or income (where τ int = 0
holds under the income tax), and a “comprehensive” or “full” flat income tax (full
FL) where τ int > 0 holds. In what follows, and for obvious reasons, we are mostly
interested in how the PET performs relative to the progressive income tax. The flat
tax, however, also serves as a useful benchmark. As already mentioned above, the
assumption τ int > 0 is rather uncommon in the DSGE literature. We will therefore
refer to the two “full” income tax systems only in passing in the following. Fi-
nally, notice that the main purpose of the subsequent account is to only give a brief,
first impression of the simulation results; to show that there are—for a wide range
of shocks—important quantitative (and sometimes also qualitative) differences be-
tween the PET and the other tax systems. Especially since we are dealing with five
different shock types, a comprehensive analysis of the deeper economic mechanisms
driving our results—in particular some of the more subtle differences between the
PET and the progressive income tax (IT)—is not within the scope of this paper and
44We checked that our results are unaffected by these choices.
45The results are robust to changes in the model parameters.
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will be therefore left for future research.
To illustrate the role of the PET in the business cycle, it will be best to first
draw a comparison with the “naked” flat tax (FL). A quick glance at the impulse
response functions reveals that there are noticeable quantitative differences between
the two tax systems. Not unexpectedly, but crucially, the responses show that for
all shock types considered, the PET leads, relative to the flat tax, to a significant
stabilization of household consumption demand. The latter, in turn, brings about,
with the exception of the government spending shock, a stabilization of aggregate
output. A first important result of this simulation exercise is thus that the PET—
just as the conventional progressive income tax (see the impulse responses for the
tax system IT)—acts as an automatic fiscal stabilizer for the economy.
Consider, for example, the responses to a (positive) technology shock. Con-
sumption and output increase, but the responses are significantly dampened under
the PET (still compared to FL). The intuition is straightforward: as consumption
rises above its steady state value, the average tax rate on household consumption
expenditure (automatically) rises as well; this mitigates the increase in consump-
tion demand and therefore output. Over the business cycle, there is thus a greater
incentive for households to smooth their consumption, the latter also mitigating
output fluctuations. For the time preference, taste, and monetary policy shocks, the
economic intuition behind the PET’s stabilizing effect on output is similar. Since
consumption and output move inversely under government spending shocks (in con-
trast to the other shock types), however, the PET’s stabilizing effect on consumption
in fact increases output fluctuations in this case (as already indicated above).46
Furthermore, our simulations show that the PET likewise reduces fluctuations
in the output gap relative to the flat tax. As the PET also increases the slope of the
Phillips curve (see Section 2.7), the latter, however, does not automatically translate
into a more stable inflation rate. We indeed observe a higher volatility of inflation
in the presence of technology and government spending shocks (see the amplitude
of the impulse responses).
Lastly, note that the PET’s performance relative to the flat tax with interest rate
taxation (full FL) is qualitatively rather similar. Yet, it becomes quite apparent that
the latter system is less successful in terms of macroeconomic stabilization than the
“naked” flat tax, especially with regards to output gap and inflation stabilization.
The reason is that a system of interest rate taxation reduces the effectiveness of
monetary policy (see the relevant IS curve).
Before we compare the PET with the progressive income tax, recall that the
PET exerts the just described general equilibrium effects in the sticky-price economy
46The PET’s effect on employment (relative to FL) also depends on whether consumption and
employment move together or in opposite directions after a shock hits the economy. Thus the
PET’s stabilizing (destabilizing) effect on employment in the presence of monetary policy, time
preference, and taste shocks (technology and government spending shocks).
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Table 2: Standard Deviations of Model Variables
— a — — ĝ — — v — — ψ — — ξ —
IT Full IT IT Full IT IT Full IT IT Full IT IT Full IT
sd(pi) +31.1 −31.7 −2.1 −49.0 −3.4 −37.2 −3.4 −49.6 −35.4 −66.3
sd(c) −13.5 −10.7 −35.5 −33.4 +31.1 −14.8 +31.1 −31.6 −10.6 −13.3
sd(n) +39.8 +28.0 +35.5 +31.4 +31.0 −14.8 +31.1 −31.6 −10.6 −13.3
sd(y) −13.5 −10.7 +35.5 +31.4 +31.0 −14.8 +31.1 −31.6 −10.6 −13.3
sd(y˜) +77.7 −7.4 +33.3 −30.7 +31.0 −14.8 +31.1 −31.6 −12.5 −54.3
Notes: Results denote the percentage change in the standard deviation of the model variable when
moving from the respective tax regime to the PET.
through, firstly, affecting the household’s intratemporal choice (labor supply), and
secondly, its intertemporal choice (Euler equation). As already referred to above,
an increase in the concavity of the household’s consumption utility function would
have a similar effect in general equilibrium (just set φc = 0 and imagine a higher σ
in the equations depicted in Table 1). The PET reduces consumption (and output)
volatility due to an automatic adjustment of tax rates over the business cycle; a
higher σ due to a more rapidly declining marginal utility of consumption.
We next draw a brief comparison between the PET and the conventional pro-
gressive income tax (IT). The impulse response functions reveal that for all five
shock types considered, there are significant quantitative differences between the
two progressive tax systems. These differences are also summarized in Table 2,
which depicts the change in the standard deviation of the main model variables
when moving from the income tax to the PET (for each shock type in isolation). A
second important result of this simulation exercise is thus that a progressive tax on
consumption expenditure produces quite different macroeconomic dynamics than a
progressive tax on wage income.
Compared to the flat tax, the macroeconomic differences between the PET and
the income tax are less clear-cut and more difficult to pin down, however. This is
not too surprising since the income tax also exerts, through affecting the household’s
intratemporal choice (labor supply), a stabilizing influence on the economy (Mat-
tesini and Rossi, 2012). We will therefore only highlight the most salient results and
leave a thorough interpretation of these results for future research.
The impulse response functions first reveal that for the shocks that affect the
flexible-price allocation (technology at, government spending gt, taste ξt), the (quite
intuitive) results of the previous comparison with the flat tax largely carry over, at
least in qualitative terms. For all three shock types, we observe that the PET sta-
bilizes consumption relative to the income tax. As before, with again the exception
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of the government spending shock, this stabilizes output.47
One of the most noticeable and interesting differences between the two tax sys-
tems indeed occurs under the government spending shock. The reason is that this
shock has an opposite effect on the tax bases of the two tax systems: consumption
and real wage income. A positive government spending shock increases aggregate de-
mand and thus real wages and employment but crowds out household consumption
demand. Due to the automatic reduction in the tax rate on consumption expen-
diture, the latter effect is attenuated under the PET, however. Instead, under the
progressive income tax, the negative effect on consumption demand is amplified by
an automatic increase in the tax rate on wages. Since consumption and output move
in opposite directions, we thus observe a bigger output response under the PET.
Interestingly, and now in contrast to the flat tax, for both shock types that do
not affect the flexible-price allocation (monetary policy vt, time preference ψt), the
income tax outperforms the PET in terms of consumption and output or employ-
ment stabilization. This is somewhat surprising at first sight since all other things
equal, the PET makes the economy less responsive to intertemporal disturbances
or (exogenous) interest rate fluctuations (compare the IS curves in Table 1). The
general equilibrium effect of these shocks, however, also depends on the endogenous
monetary policy response to inflation and its interaction with the (slope of the)
Phillips curve and is therefore difficult to work out beforehand.48 The conclusion
to be drawn from the impulse response functions is that the steeper slope of the
Phillips curve under the income tax is the decisive factor that reduces consumption
fluctuations, relative to the PET, in general equilibrium.49
At this point, it will also be useful to briefly highlight the differential effect of the
two tax systems on the volatility of inflation. The impulse response functions show
that the PET generates larger fluctuations in the inflation rate under the technology
shock, but smaller fluctuations under the government spending, monetary policy,
time preference, and taste shock (see also Table 2 for a numerical comparison). Even
though the income tax generally speaking leads to smaller output gap fluctuations
than the PET, this effect seems to be overcompensated for by the steeper slope of
the Phillips curve under the income tax.
Finally, notice that equivalent to the flat tax case considered above, the pro-
gressive income tax with interest rate taxation (full IT) has inferior macroeconomic
47The PET’s relative effect on employment then again follows from these results.
48Consider, for instance, the “first round” under the (positive) monetary policy shock (not
visible in the impulse responses). The larger initial impact of the shock on output, and by definition
the output gap, under the income tax (see the IS curve) has an even more pronounced deflationary
impact due to the steeper Phillips curve. The latter creates a stronger (endogenous) monetary
policy reversal than under the PET. This reversal then has a bigger impact on output according
to the IS curve and so forth. The net effect (not even taking expectations into account) seems
unclear.
49This seems to be a robust outcome. We also checked this result using the closed-form solutions
in Appendix A.1.
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stabilization properties (relative to both the conventional progressive income tax
and the PET; see also Table 2). Especially the output gap and thus inflation again
display rather large fluctuations.
4 Welfare
The last section has shown that the PET and the progressive income tax lead to
quite different macroeconomic dynamics. In this section, we will briefly consider
the resulting welfare implications. To this effect, we return to the original, non-
linearized model equations and employ a second-order approximation to the latter
as well as the household’s (expected) lifetime utility function.50 The program Dynare
(Adjemian et al., 2011) is again used for this exercise. Subsequently, we can compare
household welfare across tax regimes. More precisely, for both regimes, we convert
our welfare measure into a consumption loss equivalent a` la Lucas (1987). That is,






C(1− ζtax), N) = Et ∞∑
k=0
βkU (Ct+k, Nt+k) . (61)
ζtax is the percentage reduction in average steady state consumption that makes the
household indifferent between living in the (policy invariant) steady state environ-
ment (with reduced average consumption) and the stochastic environment under a
particular tax regime.
For our model parametrization, the consumption loss equivalent is given by
ζtax = 100
(
1− exp ((W tax −W )(1− β))) (62)
where W tax (W ) is welfare in the stochastic (steady state) environment.
We compute ζtax for each shock type separately. Since the absolute values of
ζtax are of less concern here (recall that we have chosen arbitrary values for the
autocorrelation coefficients and the standard deviations of the shock processes),
we only report the percentage change in ζtax when moving from the progressive
income tax to the PET.51 For the conventional income tax (IT), the results are
as follows and seem quantitatively significant: The consumption loss equivalent
increases by roughly 55% under technology shocks, but decreases by roughly 13%
under government spending shocks, 12% under monetary policy shocks, and 7%
under time preference shocks. Under taste shocks, welfare is higher under the PET
as well. Since our computations reveal that welfare in the stochastic environment
under the PET (marginally) exceeds steady state welfare, we are not able to compute
50It is in principle possible to conduct the welfare analysis using a linear-quadratic approach.
This approach is very cumbersome and prone to error, however. See e.g. Kim and Kim (2003).
51We checked that the results below do not depend on our particular shock calibration.
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Table 3: Welfare and Model Parameters
— a — — ĝ — — v — — ψ — — ξ —
IT Full IT IT Full IT IT Full IT IT Full IT IT Full IT
baseline − + + + + + + + + +
ϕ = 0.5 − + + + + + + + + +
ϕ = 2 − + + + + + + + + +
σ = 0.5 − + + + + + + + + +
σ = 2 − + + + + + + + + +
θp = 1/3 − + + + + + + + − +
θp = 1/2 − + + + + + + + 0 +
θp = 3/4 − + + + + + + + + +
φpi = 5 − − + + + + + + − −
p = 5 − + + + + + + + + +
p = 9 − + + + + + + + + +
Notes: Results show the change in welfare when moving from the respective tax regime to the
PET. A + (−) sign thus implies a higher (lower) level of welfare under the PET. The first row
shows the results for the baseline calibration. For the remaining rows, except for the parameter
explicitly stated, all other parameters are at their baseline value.
the corresponding change in ζtax in this case, however.52
In summary, moving to the PET increases welfare in the presence of all the
demand shocks, but decreases welfare in the presence of the supply shock.53 From a
welfare perspective, at least through the lens of our simple New Keynesian model,
the desirability of the PET thus crucially depends on whether shocks originate from
the demand-side or the supply-side of the economy. Furthermore, notice that the
PET’s performance relative to the progressive income tax with interest rate taxation
(full IT) is rather similar (no numbers shown). The welfare gains for the demand
shocks are somewhat higher, however. Furthermore, there is now a welfare gain for
the technology shock as well. Table 3 at last confirms that the previous results are
also quite robust across a set of different parameter values.
It is not within the scope of this paper to thoroughly analyze the drivers behind
these results. The model simulations suggest a common theme, however. When
comparing the PET with the income tax (IT), it becomes apparent that the former
increases (decreases) welfare whenever it decreases (increases) the volatility of infla-
tion relative to the latter (this effect on inflation is also captured in the linear model
above; see the respective numbers in Table 2). Furthermore, the simulations reveal
that each welfare increase (decrease) is associated with a higher (lower) consump-
52This is a rather rare but not necessarily illogical case. See e.g. Lester et al. (2014).
53Under supply (demand) shocks, output and prices move in the opposite (same) direction in
our model economy.
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tion level (not shown; note that this effect is not captured in the linear model). The
link between the volatility of inflation and the consumption level seems obvious: a
lower volatility reduces inefficient price dispersion between firms (see equation (30));
this increases the economy’s productivity (see equation (29)) and ceteris paribus af-
fords more output and thus consumption.54 The previous results therefore seem to
again confirm the importance of price stability in sticky price models. Lastly, and
as already indicated above, note that one possible reason for the PET’s relative su-
periority with respect to inflation stabilization (at least as far as demand shocks are
concerned) might be the smaller slope of the Phillips curve under the PET (which,
all other things equal, implies a lower inflation volatility). However, more research
has to be conducted to understand this link as well as the other possible drivers of
welfare.
5 Conclusion
This paper was a first attempt to examine the business cycle properties (and the
resulting welfare implications) of the personal expenditure tax (PET), an age-old
yet largely untested alternative to the personal income tax. The main contribution
of the paper was to propose a simple way to model a PET, to introduce the latter
into an otherwise standard New Keynesian DSGE model (augmented by government
expenditure), to derive a log-linear version of the model, and to draw a comparison
with the existing income tax (Mattesini and Rossi, 2012). The model simulations
have shown three things: Firstly, the PET, just as the progressive income tax, acts
as an automatic stabilizer for the economy. Yet, and secondly, the PET has a
quantitatively quite different effect on the volatilities of the main macroeconomic
variables than the income tax. Thirdly, the PET yields welfare gains, relative to the
income tax, for all the demand shocks considered; there are welfare losses, however,
under a technology shock. Overall, the simulation results suggest that there is ample
room for future research on the role of the PET in the business cycle.
The most interesting and natural extensions of the model at hand would be to
include an open economy dimension and/or real investment and capital accumula-
tion.55 Both extensions would e.g. allow for more situations where (wage) income
and consumption move in opposite directions after shocks (in our model, this holds
only for government spending shocks) and where the PET thus clearly differentiates
itself from the income tax in terms of the direction of tax rate adjustments.
In a somewhat different and elaborate model framework, our analysis of the
business cycle characteristics of the PET could be extended in a number of other
54The same line of reasoning also works for the progressive income tax with interest rate taxa-
tion.
55We briefly experimented with a model including capital. The results of the previous analysis
did not change much. However, we did not yet examine shocks that can only be considered in this
kind of model (e.g. investment shocks).
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promising ways. Firstly, the zero lower bound (ZLB) on nominal interest rates could
be incorporated into the model. This would allow us to analyze the effectiveness
of discretionary fiscal policy in a depressed economy (where the ZLB binds and
conventional monetary policy is thus impotent). One obvious exercise would be
to look at the size of the government spending multiplier in this setting. Another
interesting question to ask would be whether a temporary cut in tax rates would
provide a bigger stimulus under the PET than under the existing income tax (as
suggested by e.g. Kaldor, 1955; Frank, 2011). Secondly, to investigate how the PET
affects the economy’s response to financial shocks, a model with a realistic financial
sector (similar to e.g. Jakab and Kumhof, 2015) could be employed. For instance, it
seems plausible at first sight that a progressive tax on consumption might be more
successful in curbing economic fluctuations originating from volatile mortgage or
consumer credit markets than a progressive tax on income. It might be worthwhile
to check this intuition using a formal model. Thirdly, agent heterogeneity as in
McKay and Reis (2016b) could be included into the model. This would allow us
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For convenience, we only derived closed-form solutions for inflation pit and the out-
put gap y˜t. The closed-form solutions for the remaining model variables could be
obtained in a straightforward way, e.g. ŷt = y˜t + ŷ
f
t , n̂t = ŷt − at, and so forth.
Note that when we “switch off” the progressivity (φc = φn = 0), both systems of
taxation turn into one and the same flat tax. Also note that as in Mattesini and
Rossi (2012), the income tax featured here refrains from taxing interest income (i.e.
τ int = 0 is assumed).
For inflation pit, the closed-form solution is given by
pit = opiaat + opiggt + opiξξt + opivvt + opiψψt (63)
where
[ET ] opia = − γc(1 + ϕ)(1− ρa)(σ + φc)κc
(σ + ϕγc + φc) [(1− βρa)(1− ρa)(σ + φc) + γc(φpi − ρa)κc] < 0
[IT ] opia = − γc(1 + ϕ)(1− ρa)σκn
(σ + (ϕ+ φn)γc) [(1− βρa)(1− ρa)σ + γc(φpi − ρa)κn] < 0
[ET ] opig =
γc(1− γc)ϕ(1− ρg)(σ + φc)κc
(σ + ϕγc + φc) [(1− βρg)(1− ρg)(σ + φc) + γc(φpi − ρg)κc] > 0
[IT ] opig =
γc(1− γc)(ϕ+ φn)(1− ρg)σκn
(σ + (ϕ+ φn)γc) [(1− βρg)(1− ρg)σ + γc(φpi − ρg)κn] > 0
[ET ] opiξ =
γ2cϕ(1− ρξ)κc
(σ + ϕγc + φc) [(1− βρξ)(1− ρξ)(σ + φc) + γc(φpi − ρξ)κc] > 0
[IT ] opiξ =
γ2c (ϕ+ φn)(1− ρξ)κn
(σ + (ϕ+ φn)γc) [(1− βρξ)(1− ρξ)σ + γc(φpi − ρξ)κn] > 0
[ET ] opiv = − γcκc
(1− βρv)(1− ρv)(σ + φc) + γc(φpi − ρv)κc < 0
[IT ] opiv = − γcκn
(1− βρv)(1− ρv)σ + γc(φpi − ρv)κn < 0
[ET ] opiψ =
γc(1− ρψ)κc
(1− βρψ)(1− ρψ)(σ + φc) + γc(φpi − ρψ)κc > 0
[IT ] opiψ =
γc(1− ρψ)κn
(1− βρψ)(1− ρψ)σ + γc(φpi − ρψ)κn > 0.
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For the output gap y˜t, the closed form solution is given by
y˜t = oyaat + oyggt + oyξξt + oyvvt + oyψψt (64)
where
[ET ] oya = − γc(1 + ϕ)(1− ρa)(σ + φc)(1− βρa)
(σ + ϕγc + φc) [(1− βρa)(1− ρa)(σ + φc) + γc(φpi − ρa)κc] < 0
[IT ] oya = − γc(1 + ϕ)(1− ρa)σ(1− βρa)
(σ + (ϕ+ φn)γc) [(1− βρa)(1− ρa)σ + γc(φpi − ρa)κn] < 0
[ET ] oyg =
γc(1− γc)ϕ(1− ρg)(σ + φc)(1− βρg)
(σ + ϕγc + φc) [(1− βρg)(1− ρg)(σ + φc) + γc(φpi − ρg)κc] > 0
[IT ] oyg =
γc(1− γc)(ϕ+ φn)(1− ρg)σ(1− βρg)
(σ + (ϕ+ φn)γc) [(1− βρg)(1− ρg)σ + γc(φpi − ρg)κn] > 0
[ET ] oyξ =
γ2cϕ(1− ρξ)(1− βρξ)
(σ + ϕγc + φc) [(1− βρξ)(1− ρξ)(σ + φc) + γc(φpi − ρξ)κc] > 0
[IT ] oyξ =
γ2c (ϕ+ φn)(1− ρξ)(1− βρξ)
(σ + (ϕ+ φn)γc) [(1− βρξ)(1− ρξ)σ + γc(φpi − ρξ)κn] > 0
[ET ] oyv = − γc(1− βρv)
(1− βρv)(1− ρv)(σ + φc) + γc(φpi − ρv)κc < 0
[IT ] oyv = − γc(1− βρv)
(1− βρv)(1− ρv)σ + γc(φpi − ρv)κn < 0.
[ET ] oyψ =
γc(1− ρψ)(1− βρψ)
(1− βρψ)(1− ρψ)(σ + φc) + γc(φpi − ρψ)κc > 0
[IT ] oyψ =
γc(1− ρψ)(1− βρψ)
(1− βρψ)(1− ρψ)σ + γc(φpi − ρψ)κn > 0.
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A.2 Linearized Model: Impulse Response Functions
The figures on the next pages show the impulse response functions for the main
model variables and five different tax systems.56 “PET” denotes the progressive
consumption tax, “IT” the conventional progressive income tax (where τ int = 0),
“FL” the flat tax on either consumption or income (i.e. with τ int = 0 under the
income tax), “full IT” the progressive income tax with τ int = 0.2, and “full FL”
a flat tax on all income (i.e. τ int = 0.2). For each model variable depicted, the
graph shows the log-deviation from the steady state after a positive realization of
the relevant innovation  of one standard deviation.
56“Nom. Rate” denotes the nominal interest rate, “Real Rate” the (after-tax) real interest rate.
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Figure 1: Impulse Responses to a Positive Technology Shock










































































Figure 2: Impulse Responses to a Positive Government Spending Shock

































































Figure 3: Impulse Responses to a Positive Monetary Policy Shock





































































Figure 4: Impulse Responses to a Positive Time Preference Shock










































































Figure 5: Impulse Responses to a Positive Taste Shock







































































Diskussionsbeiträge - Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft - Freie Universität Berlin 




2019/1  WANGENHEIM, Jonas von 
  English versus Vickrey Auctions with Loss Averse Bidders 
  Economics 
 
2019/2  GÖRLITZ, Katja; Merlin PENNY und Marcus TAMM 
  The long-term effect of age at school entry on competencies in adulthood 
  Economics 
 
2019/3  BEZNOSKA, Martin 
Do Couples Pool Their Income? Evidence from Demand System Estimation 
for Germany 
  Economics 
 
2019/4  BÖNKE, Timm; Astrid HARNACK und Miriam WETTER 
Wer gewinnt? Wer verliert? Die Entwicklung auf dem deutschen Arbeitsmarkt 
seit den frühen Jahren der Bundesrepublik bis heute 
Economics 
 
2019/5  WICKBOLDT, Clemens 
Benchmarking a Blockchain-based Certification Storage System 
Information Systems 
 
2019/6  STANN, Carsten M. und Theocharis N. Grigoriadis 
Monetary Policy Transmission to Russia & Eastern Europe 
Economics 
 
2019/7  PEEVA, Aleksandra 
  Did sanctions help Putin? 
  Economics 
 
2019/8  ADAM, Marc Christopher 
  Return of the Tariffs: The Interwar Trade Collapse Revisited 
  Economics 
 
2019/9  BRILL, Maximilian; Dieter NAUTZ und Lea SIECKMANN 
  Divisia Monetary Aggregates for a Heterogeneous Euro Area 
  Economics 
 
2019/10 FISCHER, Benjamin; Robin JESSEN und Viktor STEINER 
Work Incentives and the Cost of Redistribution via Tax-transfer Reforms under 
Constrained Labor Supply 




2019/11 STROHSAL, Till und Elias WOLF 
Data Revisions to German National Accounts: Are Initial Releases Good 
Nowcasts? 
  Economics 
 
2019/12 ADAM, Marc C. und Walter JANSSON 
Credit Constraints and the Propagation of the Great Depression in Germany 
  Economics 
 
